

rest depends on their glory, and that the glory they acquire in the opinion of the wise is proportioned to the service they are of to mankind; that the project of a perpetual peace, being the greatest that ever was formed, ought to confer immortal glory on its author; that the putting it into execution, being, in like manner, the most useful to subjects, would be still more glorious to sovereigns; that this enterprize would be particularly the only one un sullied with blood and rapine, with sorrow and execration; and in fine, that the most certain way for a prince to distinguish himself among the herd of kings, is to labour for the public good. Such are the sentiments which, broached in the cabinet of princes, have brought ridicule on the author and his projects. But let us not, like them, despise his reasons: we have nothing to do with the virtues of princes; let us speak of their interests.

All the powers of Europe have real or groundless demands on one another, which are incapable of being clearly ascertained, because there is no constant and common rule by which to determine them, and also because they are often founded on equivocal and uncertain facts. The differences hence arising also are equally indeterminate, as well from want of competent arbitrators, as because each power reclaims, without scruple, those cessions, which have been exacted of him by the more powerful, in the way of treaty, or after unsuccessful wars. It is an error, therefore, to insist only on our claims on others, without reflecting on their claims on us, when there is on neither side either more justice or advantage in the means of enforcing our reciprocal pretensions. No sooner doth any thing
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depend on accident, than the actual possession is of such value, that no wise man will risk it for future profit, even upon an equal chance; whilst all the world must blame a man, who, in easy circumstances, should, in hopes to double his fortune, venture the whole on one cast of the dice.

But it has been made clear, that, even as things now stand, every power ambitious of aggrandizing itself, must meet with a resistance superior to its utmost efforts: whence it follows, that the strongest having no motive for playing, nor the weakest any prospect of winning, it becomes the interest of both, to give up what they covet, in order to secure what they possess.

Let us consider the waste of men, of money, of powers of every kind, and in what manner every state is exhausted even by the most successful war; and compare the injuries it has received with the advantages it has derived from it; we shall find the imaginary winner is still a loser; and that the conqueror, always weaker than before the war commenced, has no other consolation than to see the vanquished more exhausted than himself: while even this advantage is less real than apparent; because the superiority, which may be acquired over an adversary, hath, in the mean time, been lost with regard to neutral powers; which, without varying their situation, grow so much the stronger, with regard to us, as we grow weak.

If all Kings are not yet convinced of the folly of making conquests, it appears, at least, that the wisest of them begin to see that they cost more than they are worth. Without entering into a thousand distinctions on this head, which

which might lead us too far out of the way, it may be said, in general, that a Prince, who, by enlarging his territories, loses as many old subjects as he acquires new, becomes weaker by his acquisition; because, with more territories to defend, he hath no more subjects to defend it.

Now, it is well known, that, as wars are carried on at present, the destruction caused among the soldiery is one of the least causes of the depopulation they occasion. It is there, indeed, that the loss is more immediately felt; but there is occasioned, at the same time, a more important and irreparable loss than that of those who perish, by the want of such as might otherwise be born; by the increase of taxes, by the interruption of commerce, by the desertion of the country and the decrease of agriculture: thus the evil, which is at first hardly perceptible, is cruelly felt in the end; when we are astonished at our having been so weak as to endeavour to become powerful.

But what renders conquests still less interesting, is, that means are known at present, by which princes may increase their power two or three fold, not only without extending their territories, but sometimes by contracting them, as was very wisely done by the Emperor Adrian. It is now obvious, that the power of princes depends on the number of their subjects; and it is a truth naturally arising from what has been advanced, that of two states, containing the same number of inhabitants, that which occupies the smallest territory is actually the most powerful. It is then by means of good laws, by a prudent police, by enlarged views of œconomy, that a wise sovereign is certain of augmenting
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his forces, without putting any thing to the hazard: the real conquests he makes over his neighbours are the useful establishments he forms within his own kingdoms; while every additional new-born subject increases his power as much as if he had destroyed an enemy.

It must not be here objected, that I prove too much, in that, if things were as I represent them, each prince having an interest in abstaining from war, and his particular interests uniting with the general to the preservation of peace, such peace ought naturally to establish and support itself without a confederacy. This would be to reason very badly on the present state of things: for, though it would certainly prove more advantageous to all parties to be constantly at peace, the general want of security in this case has this effect, that each party, being uncertain of keeping out of wars, strives to commence hostilities at least with advantage, on every favourable occasion; whence it happens, that many, and these even offensive, wars, proceeds from the unjust precaution of securing one's own possessions, rather than from the design of usurping those of others. However salutary, indeed, all public-spirited maxims may be in general, it is certain, that, if we consider them only in a political, nay, even sometimes in a moral view, they become hurtful to the party who perseveres in the practices of them towards the rest of the world, when nobody will practise them towards him.

I have nothing to say on the parade of arms; because, being destitute of all solid foundation, whether of hope or fear, such parade is mere childrens play, and monarchs ought not to
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dandle puppets. I shall be as silent also on the glory of conquerors; because if there be some monsters who regret the want of objects to massacre, they ought not to be reasoned with, but deprived of the means of gratifying their sanguinary fury.

The guaranty of the third article superseding all motives for making war, there can be no better reason for any potentate's declaring it against others, than they will have for commencing hostilities against him: at the same time, it is certainly a great advantage to be secured from the risk of being in the situation wherein one is singly opposed to all.

With regard to the dependence of each party on the common tribunal, it is very clear, that it will not diminish their separate claims to sovereignty; but will, on the contrary, rather confirm such claims; which are rendered more certain by the third article; according to which, each power guarantees not only its own states against all foreign invasion, but also its sovereign authority over its subjects. Thus princes will not become the less absolute for entering into this confederacy, but will be more immoveably fixed on their respective thrones; while, by submitting to the judgment of the Congress in their disputes with their equals, and by divesting themselves of the dangerous power of seizing upon the property of others, they will render their actual rights more secure, by renouncing those which are false or doubtful. Add to this, that there is a wide difference between a dependence on others, and on a body-corporate, of which each party is always a member, and in his turn the president: for in the latter case,

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his independency is only the more ascertained by the guarantees afforded him. It would be alienated in the hands of a master, but is confirmed in those of associates.

This is confirmed by the example of the Germanic body; for, though the sovereignty of its members be varied, in many respects, by the constitution of the Empire, and are of course in a less agreeable situation than they might be as members of the European confederacy, there is nevertheless not one among them, how jealous soever he may be of his authority, who would render his independence absolute, were it in his power, by detaching himself from the rest of the Empire.

It is farther to be observed also, that the Germanic body, having a permanent chief, his authority is constantly tending to usurpation; a circumstance that could never happen in the European Congress, where the presidentship would be alternate, and no respect would be had to the inequality of the several potentates.

To all these considerations may be added another, still more important to people who are so fond of money as princes always are: this is, the facility of amassing a great quantity, from the advantages resulting, both to them and their people, from a perpetual peace; considering the vast expence that will be saved in the article of military preparations, in the keeping up of fortifications, and the support of numerous troops, which eat up the revenues, and become every day more burdensome both to prince and subject.

I am sensible it is not convenient for sovereigns to disband all their forces, and to have no troops ready to repel sudden invaders, and to suppress

popular insurrections. I am sensible, also, that the several members of the confederacy will be obliged to furnish their contingents, as well for guarding the frontiers of Europe, as for the support of the confederate army destined occasionally to enforce the determinations of the Congress. But when all those charges are defrayed, and the extraordinary expences of war totally suppressed, there will still be a saving of more than half the present military expences; which will lessen the burden laid on the subject, and fill the coffers of the sovereign: so that the people will be subject to much fewer taxes; and the prince, being much enriched, would be enabled to give encouragement to trade, agriculture, and arts, as well as to lay the foundation of useful establishments that would still farther increase his and his people's wealth. Add to this, that the independence of the state would derive from such means a much greater security than it could do from the maintenance of national troops, and that military pomp, which is constantly exhausting it in the midst of peace.

It will be said, perhaps, that the frontier-countries would be then in a more disadvantageous situation, and would still have as many wars to maintain against the Turks, the Tartars, and the Corsairs of Africa.

To this I answer, first, That those countries are, as it is, in the same circumstances; and that therefore our project would be of no positive disadvantage to them, though less advantageous than it might be to others; this being an unavoidable inconvenience, to which their situation naturally exposes them. Secondly, That by being freed from any apprehensions of

danger on the side of Europe, they would be much better able to oppose their other enemies. Thirdly, That the demolition of the fortresses in the interior parts of Europe, and the saving of the expences necessary for their support, would enable the confederacy to establish a great number of fortresses on the frontiers, without expence to any particular member. Fourthly, That such fortresses, built, garrisoned, and maintained at the common expence, would prove a security, as well as a saving of charges, to the potentates on the frontiers, whose states they would more immediately protect. Fifthly, That the troops of the confederacy, stationed on the confines of Europe, would be always ready to repel any invader. And, sixthly, That a body so powerful as the European Republic, would be too formidable to foreign princes, for them to entertain a design of attacking any of its members; since we see the Germanic body, though much less powerful, is yet sufficiently so to awe its neighbours into respect, and to afford an useful protection to the princes composing it.

It may be objected farther, that, should the Europeans cease to make war on each other, the military art would soon fall into neglect and oblivion; that their troops would lose their courage and discipline; that there would no longer exist either generals or soldiers; and that Europe would thus lie at the mercy of the first foreign invader.

To this I reply, that one of these two things must happen; either that our neighbours of the other parts of the world would make war on Europe, or that they would respect the confederacy so much as to leave it in peace.

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Now, in the first case, there would be opportunities enough of cultivating military talents, in raising and forming troops. The armies of the confederacy would be, in that respect, the school of Europe; people would repair to the frontiers to learn the art of war, while the arts of peace would flourish in the interior parts, and thus the advantages of both would be united. Can it be thought necessary that we should be always cutting one another's throats, to cultivate the art of war? or are the French less brave, because the provinces of Anjou and Touraine are at peace with each other?

In the second case, it must be owned, that no opportunity would be left of cultivating the military art; but then there would remain no longer any necessity for it. For, what purpose would it serve to train people to arms, who would have no enemy to attack? And which is to be preferred, the cultivation of a destructive art, or the project that renders it useless? If a secret were existing, by means of which mankind might enjoy constant health, would it not be absurd to reject it, because it would deprive the Physicians of the opportunities of acquiring experience? It remains to be shewn which of the two arts, in this parallel, is most salutary, and best deserves to be retained.

Let us not be terrified with a sudden invasion; it is well known that Europe has, on that score, nothing to fear, and that this first invader will never appear. This is not a time for the irruptions of Barbarians, who seemed to drop in swarms from the clouds. Since we have been able to take a nearer survey of the whole surface of the earth, nothing can approach

us, that may not be seen at a great distance. There is no potentate in the world, at present, in a situation formidable against all Europe. And if ever there should be such a power, either we shall have time to prepare ourselves, or shall be at least in a better situation to oppose him, being united in one body, than when our long disputes are to be terminated at once, in order to patch up an hasty union.

Thus we have shewn, that all the pretended inconveniencies of such a confederacy are, on examination, reducible to nothing. We now ask, if any man in the world will venture to affirm as much of those inconveniencies which arise from the present manner of deciding the disputes of sovereigns by the law of the strongest? That is to say, from that impolitic state of war, which necessarily results from the absolute and mutual independence of sovereigns, in the imperfect state of society which at present subsists between them in Europe?

To be better able to judge of these latter inconveniencies, I shall just recapitulate a summary of them in a few words; and leave it to the reader's examination.

1. No one's rights are secured but those of the strongest.
2. Continual and unavoidable changes in the relations subsisting between nations, which hinder any of them from fixing in their own hands the power they actually possess.
3. No perfect security for any power till its neighbours be subdued or destroyed.
4. The general impossibility of destroying them; as even by destroying one, others are formed.
5. The precautions and immense expences attendant on being always upon one's guard.
6. The want
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of forces and of defence in minorities and revolts; for when the state is divided, who can support one party against the other? 7. The want of security for the performance of mutual engagements. 8. Justice is never to be obtained from others without great loss and expence, nor always then; while the object in dispute seldom proves an indemnification. 9. The unavoidable risk princes run of losing their dominions, and sometimes their lives, in the prosecution of their rights. 10. The necessity of taking a part in the quarrels of neighbours, and of being drawn into a war contrary to one's inclination. 11. The interruption of trade and public supplies, at a time when they are most required. 12. The continual danger from a powerful neighbour, if one is weak, and from a league, if one is strong. 13. The inutility of prudence with regard to what is subject to fortune; the perpetual destruction of people; the diminution of the strength of the state both from good and ill success; the total impossibility of establishing a good government, of accounting any thing one's own, and rendering either ourselves or others happy.

Let us recapitulate, in the same manner, the advantages which the confederate princes of Europe will reap from arbitration.

1. Absolute security that their present and future differences will be always terminated without a war; a security incomparably more useful to sovereigns, than that of never being engaged in a law-suit would be to any of their subjects.

2. The removal of all subjects in dispute, or their reduction to little or nothing, by the cessa-

tion of all former pretensions; which will compensate for what they give up, and secure what they possess.

3. Complete and constant security for the person, family, and dominions of the prince, and of the order of succession fixed by the laws of each country, as well against the ambitious views of unjust pretenders, as against the revolts of rebellious subjects.

4. Perfect security for the execution of all reciprocal engagements between prince and prince, by the guaranty of the whole European republic.

5. Perfect and perpetual liberty and security, in regard to commerce, as well that carried on between the states of the confederacy, as that carried on separately by each state with distant nations.

6. A total and perpetual suppression of the extraordinary military expence, both by sea and land, in times of war, and even a considerable diminution of the ordinary expences in time of peace.

7. The sensible progress of agriculture and population, with the increasing wealth of the people and the revenue of the prince.

8. The facilitating all establishments, which may redound to the glory and authority of the sovereign, increase the public resources, or promote the happiness of the people.

I now leave the reader, as I before observed, to his examination of all these articles, and to form a comparison between the state of peace resulting from the proposed confederacy, and the state of war which results from the present impolitic state of Europe.

If we have reasoned rightly in laying down this project, it has been demonstrated, first, That the establishment of a perpetual peace depends solely on the consent of the respective sovereigns, and that there is no other obstacle to it than their opposition. Secondly, That this establishment would be every way useful; and that no comparison is to be made, even with regard to them, between the inconveniences and advantages resulting from it. Thirdly, That it is reasonable to suppose their inclination will agree with their interests. And, lastly, that this establishment, if once formed on the plan proposed, would be solid and lasting, and perfectly answer the end designed. We cannot, indeed, take upon us to say, that the sovereigns of Europe will actually adopt our project, (who can answer for the judgment of others?) but we can safely say, they would adopt it, if they knew their true interests: for it should be observed, that we have not supposed men to be such as they ought to be, good, generous, disinterested, and public-spirited from motives of humanity; but, on the contrary, such as they really are, unjust, avaricious, and more solicitous for their private interest than that of the public. The only supposition we have made, is, that mankind have sense enough in general to know what is useful to them, and fortitude enough to embrace the means of their own happiness. Should our project, nevertheless, fail of being put into execution, it will not be neglected because it is chimerical, but because the world is absurd, and there is a kind of absurdity in being wise among fools.

AN
EXPOSTULATORY
LETTER

FROM

J. J. ROUSSEAU,

Citizen of GENEVA.

TO

CHRISTOPHER de BEAUMONT,

Archbishop of PARIS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

The MANDATE of the said Prelate,

AND ALSO

The Proceedings of the Parliament of Paris, relative to the New Treatise on Education entitled EMILIUS.

Da veniam si quid liberius dixi, non ad contumeliam tuam, sed ad defensionem meam. Præsumpsi enim de gravitate et prudentia tua, quia potes considerare quantam mihi respondendi necessitatem imposueris.

AUG. Epist. 238. ad PASCENT.

PROCEEDINGS
IN THE
PARLIAMENT of PARIS.

ENTERED, this day, the officers of our Lord the King; M. Omer-Joly de Fleury, advocate of our said Lord the King, presenting an information to the Court, against a work entitled *Emilius*, &c. by J. J. Rousseau, citizen of Geneva, in words and to the effect following:

That the said work appears to be composed only with a view to re-establish natural religion; the author labouring, in the plan of education he affects to pursue with his pupil, to illustrate and recommend that criminal system.

That the author affects to instruct his said pupil according to nature, which he makes his only guide in the formation of his moral man; that he regards all religions as equally salutary, and as having all their peculiar reasons in the climate, government, genius of the people, or other local cause, which makes the one preferable to another only according to the circumstances of time and place.

That he would have man confine himself to that kind of knowledge which instinct alone prompts him to pursue; pretending that the passions are the principal instruments of our preservation; and asserting that men may be saved without believing in God, on the supposition of an invincible ignorance, which he maintains
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some persons may lie under with regard to the Deity, and which will excuse their unbelief. That, according to the principles of this writer, we should be directed in the choice of a religion by reason only; by the dictates of which we should also leave the mode of that worship which mankind are to pay, to the Supreme Being; whom the author affects to honour, in speaking with impiety of those external ceremonies of religion, which that Being hath established, or the church hath prescribed, under the direction and influence of his holy Spirit.

That, in consequence of this system of admitting no other than natural religion, whatever form it assume among different people, he hath endeavoured to disprove the truth of the holy scriptures and prophecies, the certainty of the miracles contained in the sacred writings, the infallibility of revelation, and the authority of the church: that, in recurring on every occasion to this natural religion, he undertakes to justify not only all religions indiscriminately, pretending that salvation may be found in all; but even the infidelity and scepticism of all those whom we may in vain endeavour to convince of the divinity of Jesus Christ and the truth of the Christian religion, which alone hath God for its author, and with regard to which he carries his blasphemy so far, as to treat it as ridiculous and contradictory, and to inculcate a sacrilegious indifference for its mysteries and tenets; all which he endeavours to destroy.

That such are the impious and detestable principles which the writer proposes to establish in his said treatise; throughout which he subjects religion to the examination of reason, which

can establish only mere human creeds, and which admits of no other truths or dogmas in religion than such as it may please the understanding, left to its own light, or rather its own darkness, to receive or reject.

That to these impieties the author hath added many indecent details and illustrations directly contrary to modesty and decorum, as well as pretensions tending odiously and falsely to misrepresent the sovereign authority, to destroy the principles of that obedience which is due to it, and to lessen the respect and affection of the subjects for their kings.

That the informants conceive these instances sufficient to give the court an idea of the work in question: that the maxims which are scattered throughout, unite to form a chimerical system, as impracticable in the execution, as absurd and criminal in its design: that subjects educated in such maxims could not fail of being prejudiced in favour of scepticism and toleration; of being abandoned to their passions, and devoted to the pleasures of sense; of becoming deaf to every thing but the voice of nature; and of substituting, instead of the noble desire of true glory, this pernicious phrenzy of singularity. What rules for the formation of manners! What members of church and state must such children prove who are educated in principles that are equally shocking to the citizen and Christian!

That the author of the said book, not having scrupled to set his name to the work, cannot be too expeditiously prosecuted; for that it is of importance, since he is known, that justice should make an example as well of the writer, as of those who may be discovered to have assist-

ed either in the printing or distributing a work that deserves, together with its author and publisher, to be treated with the greatest severity.

That such is the substance of the written information, now left, with a copy of the book, in court. On this the officers retired.

The matter of the said information having been taken into consideration, it is resolved by the Court, That the said printed book, entitled *Emilius*, &c. be torn to pieces and burnt, in the court of the palace, at the foot of the grand stairs, by the common executioner. All persons possessed of copies of the said book, are also enjoined to bring them to the register of the court, in order to have them suppressed. And all bookfellers are expressly forbidden to print, sell, or publish the said book; as are also all hawkers and others, either to vend or distribute the same, under pain of being immediately prosecuted to the utmost severity of the law. It is also ordered by the Court, at the request of the King's Attorney-general, That information be taken before the reporting counsel of all such writers as may be found in Paris; and before the lieutenants-criminal of their respective bailiwicks, of all such as may offer, without the said city, to give evidence against the author, printers, or venders of the said book. That the said information, when taken, be communicated to the King's Attorney-general; to be proceeded on as he shall judge proper, or the Court order relating thereto. It is further ordered, That the said J. J. Rousseau, mentioned in the title-page of the said book, be in the mean time apprehended, taken, and committed to the prisons of the Conciergerie of the palace, in order to be
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heard and interrogated before the said reporting counsel, touching the matter of the said book; and to answer to the information which the Attorney-general hath taken against him: and in case the said J. J. Rousseau cannot be apprehended and taken, on search after his person, for fourteen days, that his effects be seized, and an inventory thereof be taken, and lodged in the hands of the commissaries appointed for that purpose, till the said Rousseau shall appear agreeable to this order. And to these purposes it is ordered, that a copy of the said book be left with the register of this court, to serve for the instructions relative to the process. Ordered, lastly, That the present arret be printed, published, and stuck up wherever it may be thought requisite. Done in parliament, *June 9, 1762.*

Signed, DU FRANC.

On Friday the 11th of *June 1762*, the above-mentioned book was torn to pieces, and burned at the foot of the great stair-case of the palace, by the public executioner, in the presence of me Etienne Dagobert Ysabeau, one of the three principal commissaries of the great chamber, assisted by the two serjeants of the court.

Signed YSABEAU.

THE
M A N D A T E
O F T H E
A R C H B I S H O P of P A R I S ;

Condemning the New Treatise on Education, entitled Emilius, &c. by J. J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva.

CHristopher de Beaumont, by the grace of God, and by favour of the holy apostolic see, archbishop of Paris, duke of St Cloud, peer of France, commander of the order of the Holy Ghost, patron of the Sorbonne, &c. to all the faithful of our diocese, health and benediction.

St Paul, my dear brethren, hath foretold, that perilous times should come, in which men should be lovers of themselves, proud, blasphemers, unholy, false accusers, high-minded, lovers of pleasures more than of God, men of corrupt minds, reprobates concerning the faith *. And in what times hath this prediction been more literally fulfilled than in the present ! Infidelity, encouraged by the passions, presents itself in every shape, in order to accommodate itself in some measure to persons of all ages, characters, and conditions of life. Sometimes, in
order

* 2 Tim. iii. 1, 4, 8.

order to insinuate itself into the minds of those who are captivated with trifles, it assumes a light, agreeable, and frivolous style; hence we see a numerous tribe of romances, equally impious and obscene, whose sole end is to divert the imagination, with a view to seduce the understanding and to corrupt the heart. Sometimes, assuming an air of sublimity, it affects to recur to the first principles of human knowledge, and pretends to deduce from thence authority for casting off a yoke said to be disgraceful to humanity, even that of divinity itself. Sometimes it furiously declaims against religious zeal, and in a rage preaches up universal toleration. And again, sometimes, uniting all the different modes of language, it mingles gravity with mirth, the maxims of purity with those of charity, truth with error, and religion with blasphemy; endeavouring, in a word, to reconcile light with darkness, and Christ with Belial. This, my dear brethren, appears in a particular manner the object of a recent publication, entitled *Emilius*, &c. A writer hath here started up, who, educated in the midst of error, is full of the language of philosophy, though no true philosopher: possessed of a multiplicity of knowledge, which nevertheless hath not served to enlighten his understanding, he hath made use of it to darken the understanding of others; he is given up to paradoxes both in opinion and practice, uniting simplicity of manners with ostentation of doctrine, a zeal for ancient maxims with a passion for establishing the most singular novelties, the obscurity of retirement with a desire of being known to the whole world. We have seen his invectives against those very sci-

ences which he himself cultivated : we hear him acknowledge the excellence of the gospel, while he is endeavouring to depreciate its tenets ; and see him describing the beauty of virtue, at the same time that he is striving to extinguish the love of it in the hearts of his readers. He hath assumed the preceptorship of human kind, in order to deceive them ; he hath erected himself into a public monitor, to lead the world astray ; and hath played the oracle of the age, in order to complete its destruction. In a former treatise, on the Inequality of Mankind, he hath reduced man to a level with the brutes : in another production, still more recent, he hath insinuated all the poison of inordinate pleasure, under pretence of prohibiting it : and, in the present, he takes advantage of the earliest moments of life, to establish in the mind of man the maxims of irreligion and infidelity.

What a horrid enterprize, my dear brethren ! The education of youth is one of the most important objects of the zeal and solicitude of the pastors of the church. We are sensible that, in order to reform the world, as far as the weakness and corruption of our nature will permit, it would be sufficient to observe, under the direction and impressions of grace, the dawnings of human reason, and to direct it in the way that leads to all truth. By such means, the mind, as yet exempt from prejudice, may be put for ever on its guard against error ; and the heart, as yet a stranger to the violent passions, may receive impressions of every virtue. But to whom doth it more properly belong, than to us and our fellow-labourers in the ministry, thus to watch over the early progress of Christian youth ; to
furnish

furnish them with the spiritual milk of the word, so that they may grow in grace †; to prepare them betimes, by salutary exhortations, to be sincere worshippers of the true God, faithful subjects to their king, and men worthy to become the support and ornament of their country?

Now the author of *Emilius*, my dear brethren, hath laid down a plan of education, which, so far from being consistent with Christianity, is not even calculated to form either good citizens or good men. Under the vain pretence of restoring man to himself, and educating his pupil agreeable to nature, he assumes as a maxim, an assertion contradictory not only to the doctrines of religion, but also to the experience of all ages and nations. “ We lay it down, says he, as an
 “ incontestable maxim, that the first emotions
 “ of nature are always right; and that there is
 “ no original perversity in the human heart.” How contradictory is this to the doctrines of the holy Scripture and the church, respecting the change made in our nature by the fall! In this maxim, we lose sight of that divine ray which discovers to us the mystery of our own hearts. Yes, my dear brethren, we find within us a striking mixture of greatness and meanness, of a passion for truth and a love of error, of an inclination to virtue and a tendency to vice: an astonishing contrast, which, disconcerting the pagan philosophers, left them to blunder on in vain speculations! A contrast, of which revelation discloses the source, in the deplorable disobedience of our first parents! In consequence of their defection it is, that man finds himself drawn by a fatal tendency to vice: and how is he
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* 1 Pet. ii. 2.

he to resist and stand against it, if his infancy be not conducted by preceptors replete with attention, virtue, and prudence; and if, during the whole course of his life, he doth not, under the protection and by the grace of God, make continual and forcible efforts against it? Alas! my dear brethren, in spite of the most careful and virtuous education, in spite of the most encouraging promises and dreadful menaces of religion, the failings of youth are still too frequent, too numerous. Into what errors, into what excesses, do they not, when left alone, precipitate themselves! The torrent breaks in upon them, in spite of the strongest mounds that may be thrown up to oppose it: what would be the case, then, if no obstacle were raised to break its efforts and divert its force?

The author of *Emilius*, who professes to be of no religion, points out the way, nevertheless, without designing it, which leads infallibly to true religion. “How shall we, says he, who, on all occasions, pretend to cast off the yoke of authority; we who pay no regard to opinion; who would teach our pupil nothing but what he might have learnt himself in any country; in what religion shall we educate *Emilius*? To what sect shall we unite the man of nature? The answer appears to me very simple: We shall unite him neither to one nor another; but place him in a proper situation, and qualify him to make choice of that which the best use of his reason may induce him to adopt.”

Would to God, my dear brethren, this object had been attained! Had the author really qualified his pupil to make choice of that religion which the best use of his reason would

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have induced him to adopt, he would infallibly have prepared him for receiving the doctrines of Christianity. For certain it is, my dear brethren, that the light of nature conducts to the light of the gospel; and the duty of a Christian is indeed a *reasonable* service †. In fact, if the best use of our reason does not lead us to the Christian revelation, our faith is in vain, and our hope of none effect. But in what manner you may say, doth the best use of our reason, conduct us to the inestimable blessing of faith, and from thence to the precious assurance of salvation? It is to reason itself, that we may safely appeal. If we acknowledge a God, our great concern is next to know whether he hath condescended to speak to mankind in another manner than by the works of nature. To determine this, we must examine if the evidence of the facts on which revelation is founded be not superior to all the efforts of the most artful chicanery.

Infidelity hath often attempted to invalidate the evidence of these facts, and as often hath been convinced of its importance. God hath borne witness of himself in the holy Scriptures, and this testimony is most worthy of belief. What remains, therefore, for a man who makes the best use of his reason, but to acquiesce in this testimony? It is thy grace, O Lord, which completes this work of illumination; it is that which determines the will, which forms the heart of the Christian; but it is the display of its evidence, and the force of its motives, that previously employ and purify the understanding; and in this work, not less noble than indispensable, consists that best use of our reason, which
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† Rom. xii. 1.

the author of *Emilius* undertakes to speak of, without having any fixed or certain idea concerning it.

In order that a youth should possess the requisite docility to receive his tutor's instructions, this author would have him be destitute of every principle of religion. His reason for which extraordinary document is this: "To know good from evil, and to be sensible of the duties of a man, is not the province of a child.—I should as soon, adds he, require a child to be five feet high, as to have judgement at ten years of age." Doubtless, my dear brethren, the human understanding hath its progress, and is improved by degrees: but doth it thence follow, that a child at ten years of age should not know the difference between good and evil; that he should confound prudence with folly, good nature with cruelty, and virtue with vice? May he not be sensible, at that age, that obedience to his parents is a virtue, and disobedience a vice? To assert he is not, my dear brethren, is to calumniate human nature, in supposing it capable of a degree of stupidity to which it is a stranger. "Every child who believes in God, says this author, is an idolater or an anthropomorphite." But, if it be an idolater, it must believe in many gods, and attribute the divine nature to insensible images. If it be only an anthropomorphite, it invests the true God with a corporeal form. Now we can suppose neither the one nor the other of a child who is educated a Christian. Its education may possibly be deficient in this particular; but it is highly unjust to impute that to religion, which is only owing to the defects of instruction. Add to this, that it cannot be

expected a boy of ten years of age should be a philosopher; hence, though he may be well taught, he may but ill explain himself: but, when we teach him that the Deity is of a different nature from objects of sense; that, possessed of infinite intelligence, and supreme power, it executes whatever it pleases; we certainly give him such a notion of God as is adapted to his understanding. It is not to be doubted that an atheist might easily perplex and confound such a young believer with his artful sophisms: but not all his address can make it appear, that, when a child so instructed believes in God, he is nothing more than an idolater or anthropomorphite; that is to say, that he believes only in the existence of a chimera.

But this author, my dear brethren, goes still farther, and denies that even a young man of fifteen is capacitated to believe in God. Man at that age, therefore, must be supposed not to know whether there is a God or not; it is in vain the works of nature display the glory of their Creator, he understands not their expressive language. It must be supposed that he exists without knowing to whom he owes existence; and that reason itself contributes to involve him in this ignorance and darkness. It is thus, my dear brethren, that blind impiety endeavours to darken, with the clouds of obscurity, the torch which religion presents to mankind in every period of human life. St Augustine reasoned justly on other principles, when, in speaking of his early years, he said, "I fell, at that time, Lord, into the hands of those who are careful to call on thy name; and comprehended by their discourses concern-

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ing thee, and agreeable to the capacity of my tender years, that thou wert something great; and that, although invisible, and removed beyond the reach of our senses, thou couldest hear our prayers and relieve us. Hence I began, from my very infancy, to address thee by prayer, and to regard thee as my protector and my support; the earliest employment of my tongue being to call on thy holy name *.”

Let us go on, my dear brethren, to the farther unaccountable paradoxes of the author of *Emilius*. Let us see whether, after having reduced young persons to such a state of profound ignorance with respect to the attributes of the Deity, he will admit them to know more of themselves. Do they know whether they are possessed of a soul distinct from the body? Or do they look on themselves as beings purely material and subject to the laws of mechanism? The author of *Emilius* doubts whether it be time to teach a pupil, even at eighteen years of age, that he hath a soul; pretending, that “if he learns it sooner, he runs a risk of never knowing it so long as he lives.” But will he not admit, that youth may be sensible of their moral duties? No. If we believe our author, “There are none but physical objects that will interest children, particularly those whose vanity is not yet excited, and that are not corrupted by the poison of prejudice.

Agreeable to these notions, he would have all the pains we take in the earlier part of education confined to what is material and terrestrial in man. Exercise, says he, their bodies, their organs,

* *Lib. I. Confess. chap. ix.*

gans, their natural forces ; but keep the soul as inactive as possible.

This mental indolence and inactivity appears to him necessary, in order to dispose the mind to receive those errors he means to inculcate. But to think of instructing mankind in wisdom, at a season when their growing passions are most prevalent, is to inculcate it in a manner which the author himself explodes.

How opposite, my dear brethren, is such a mode of education as this, to that which right reason and true religion unitedly dictate ! These require that a prudent and vigilant preceptor should be on the watch, as it were, to discover in the pupil the first dawnings of intelligence, in order to captivate the understanding with the beauty of truth ; and for the first emotions of the heart, in order to engage it by the charms of virtue. How much better is it, in fact, to prevent obstacles, than to leave them to be surmounted ? How much is it to be feared, if the impressions of vice should precede the precepts of virtue, that men, when arrived at a certain age, will want both courage and will to resist vicious allurements ? Doth not happy experience daily demonstrate, that persons educated in virtuous principles, recovering from the irregularities of an ill-spent youth, return at last to the salutary practice of those maxims they were taught in their childhood ?

We need not however be surpris'd, my dear brethren, that this author defers so long the knowledge of the existence of a Deity, when he doth not believe it necessary to salvation. " It is clear, (says he, in the character of an imaginary personage,) that a man may, under

some circumstances, live to grow old without believing in God ; and yet he would not, for that reason, be deprived of his presence in the other world, if his unbelief was involuntary.”

Observe, my dear brethren, the author does not mean here a person who is incapable of the use of reason, but merely one whose reason might have received no assistance from information. Now such a pretence is absurd, particularly on the system of this writer, who affirms human reason to be absolutely perfect. St Paul indeed assures us, that, among the Pagan philosophers, many had, by the force of reason alone, arrived at the knowledge of the true God. “ That which may be known of God, saith the apostle, is manifest in them ; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead : so that they are without excuse ; because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools †.”

Now, if such was the crime of these men, who, being subjected by the prejudices of their education to the worship of idols, yet did not fail to attain to the knowledge of the true God ; how can those, who have no such obstacles to surmount, be so innocent and blameless as to merit the enjoyment of the presence of God in another life ? how can they be excusable, (possessed of right reason as our author supposes,)

† Rom. i. 19.

poses,) in having contemplated during this life the magnificent prospect of the universe, and yet remain ignorant of its Creator, Preserver, and Governor?

The same writer, my dear brethren, takes openly the side of scepticism with regard to creation and the unity of God. Thus he makes the same imaginary personage say, "I believe that the world is governed by a wise and powerful Will. I see it, or rather I feel it, and this is of importance for me to know: but is the world eternal, or is it created? Are things derived from one self-sufficient principle, or are there two or more? And what is their essence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I see that it is of any consequence I should.—I give up all such idle disquisitions, which serve only to make me discontented with myself, are useless in practice, and superior to my understanding." What is it this daring author means to say? He believes the world to be governed by a wise and powerful Will; he confesses it is of importance to him to know this: and yet he knows not, he says, whether things are derived from one self-existent principle, or from many; and he pretends it is of little consequence whether he doth or no. If there be really a wise and powerful Being who governs the world, is it conceivable that he should not be the sole principle or efficient cause of all things? And can it be more important to know one than the other? What a contradiction! He knows nothing of the nature of God; and yet presently after he acknowledges this Supreme Being to be possessed of intelligence, power, will, and goodness; is not this to have an idea of the divine nature? The uni-

ty of God appears to him a futile and indeterminate question; as if the notion of a multiplicity of gods were not the greatest of all absurdities. *The plurality of Gods*, says Tertullian very expressively, tends to the *nullity of God*. To admit a God, is to admit a supreme and independent Being, to which all other beings are subordinate. This writer insinuates, therefore, that there are many gods.

It is not surprising, my dear brethren, that a man who gives into such errors respecting the Deity, should stand up to oppose the religion he hath revealed. According to this author, all revelations in general debase the Deity, in ascribing to him human passions. "So far from giving us enlightened notions of the Supreme Being, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the most obscure and confused ideas. To the inconceivable mysteries by which the Deity is hid from our view, they add the most absurd contradictions."

We may, with much greater justice, my dear brethren, reproach this author with inconsistency and absurdity. It is he who degrades the Deity, who confounds and debases our notions of that great Being, by directly disputing his essence, and questioning his unity.

He is sensible that the truth of the Christian revelation is proved by facts; but concerning the miracles constituting the principal evidence of that revelation, he cries out, "Who were witnesses to these miracles?—Men—Always human testimony! It is always men that tell me what other men have told them. What a number of these are constantly between me and the Deity!" To justify this complaint, my dear
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brethren, we ought to be able to affirm that a revelation must be false when it is not made to every individual; we ought to be able to say, "God cannot require us to believe any thing he hath said, unless he had particularly addressed himself to us." But are there not an infinite number of facts, even prior to that of the Christian revelation, of which it would be absurd to doubt? Now by what means do we acquire the knowledge of these facts but by human testimony? By what other means did our author himself become acquainted with Sparta, with Athens, and with Rome, on whose laws, manners, and heroes, he lavishes such extravagant encomiums? What a number of men there must have been between him and the events which relate to the origin and catastrophe of those ancient republics! What a number of men between him and even the historians that have transmitted to us an account of those events! The scepticism of our author, therefore, with regard to this particular, is evidently founded on nothing but his own infidelity.

"What if a man (says he, a little farther) should come and harangue us in the following manner: *I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the Most High; acknowledge in my voice that of him who sent me. I command the sun to move backwards, the stars to change their places, the mountains to disappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aspect.* Who would not, at the sight of such miracles, immediately attribute them to the Author of nature?" Who would not think, my dear brethren, that a writer who speaks in this manner wanted only to be a witness to a

miracle, to become a Christian? But hear what he says further: "The most important examination, after all, remains to be made into the doctrines delivered.—After proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine.—Now, what is to be done in this case? There is but one step to be taken, To recur to reason, and leave miracles to themselves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourse to them." That is, my dear brethren, as much as to say, "Shew me a miracle, and I will believe; and yet, when you have shewn me a miracle, I will not believe." What inconsistency and absurdity! But it is well known, that, in the affair of miracles, we do not admit that sophistry with which the author of this treatise reproaches us.

When the doctrine is acknowledged to be divine, and to be founded on the truth of positive revelation, we make use of it, indeed, to judge of the miracles; that is, to reject the pretended prodigies which impostors may set up against such doctrine. When the point in question is an entire new doctrine, which is said to be dictated by the Spirit of God, miracles are produced as proofs of it: that is to say, the person who assumes the character of a missionary from the Most High, confirms his mission and the doctrines he preaches by miracles, which are the testimony of God himself. Thus the doctrine and the miracles are made use of respectively, according to the different points of view in which they are placed, in the study or illustration of religion. But in this there is no abuse of argument, ridiculous sophistry, or absurd

furd reasoning in a circle, as hath been frequently demonstrated by those who have undertaken to obviate this trite objection. Nor is it probable that the author of *Emilius* should be ignorant of these demonstrations: but according to the plan he hath pursued, of throwing obscurity on all revealed religion and supernatural operations, he maliciously imputes to us such arguments as are disgraceful to reason. Thus he represents us as enthusiasts, whom a false and blinded zeal urges on to prove two principles, one by the other, without any diversity in the state of the question or method. Where, my good brethren, is that philosophical candour, that sincerity, of which this writer makes so great a boast?

Will it be believed, that, after having taken the greatest pains to invalidate the human testimony of the Christian revelation, the same author should pay it the most solemn and positive deference imaginable? To convince you, however, of his strange inconsistency, and at the same time to serve for your edification, my dear brethren, I shall cite the passages wherein he hath done this in the plainest terms. "I will confess to you, says he, that the majesty of the scriptures strikes me with admiration, as the purity of the gospel hath its influence on my heart. Peruse the works of our philosophers with all their pomp of diction; how mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the scriptures! Is it possible that a book, at once so simple and sublime, should be merely the work of man? Is it possible that the sacred Personage, whose history it contains, should be himself a mere man? Do we find that he assumed the tone
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of an enthusiast or ambitious sectary? What sweetness, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulness in his delivery! What sublimity in his maxims! What profound wisdom in his discourses! What presence of mind, what subtilty, what truth in his replies! How great the command over his passions! Where is the man, where is the philosopher, who could so live and so die, without weakness and without ostentation?—Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God. Shall we suppose the evangelic history a mere fiction? Indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary, the history of Socrates, which nobody presumes to doubt, is not so well attested as that of Jesus Christ.—It is more inconceivable that a number of persons should agree to write such a history, than that one only should furnish the subject of it. The Jewish authors were incapable of the diction, and strangers to the morality contained in the gospel; the marks of whose truth are so striking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more surprising character than the hero of it.”

It would be difficult, my dear brethren, to express a more explicit homage to the authenticity of the Gospel: And yet the author acknowledges it only in consequence of human testimony. It is always men that report what other men have reported. What a number of men between God and him! Nothing can be more evident than that the writer here contradicts himself, and is confuted on his own principle. How strangely infatuated therefore is this author, to add, “And yet, with all this,
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the same Gospel abounds with incredible relations, with circumstances repugnant to reason, and which it is impossible for a man of sense either to conceive or admit. What is to be done amidst all these contradictions? Be modest and circumspect: regard in silence what cannot be either disproved or comprehended; and humble thyself before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth. Such is the involuntary scepticism in which I remain." But can this scepticism, my dear brethren, be indeed involuntary, when he refuses to admit the doctrines of a book, which, by his own confession, cannot be the work of man! when this book bears the marks of truth, so striking, so great, and so inimitable, that the inventor would be more astonishing than the hero of it? Surely we may here safely say, that iniquity hath belied itself.

It appears, my dear brethren, that this author hath rejected revelation, only to adopt natural religion. "What God requires us to do, says he, he doth not tell us from the mouths of others; but inscribes it in the bottom of our hearts." But hath not God written in our hearts the obligation of believing in him, when we are convinced that it is he who hath spoken? Now what certitude have we not that the Scriptures are the word of God? The actions of Socrates, of which no one hath the least doubt, are, by the confession of this author himself, not so well attested as those of Jesus Christ. Natural religion, therefore, itself, directs us to receive that which is revealed. But it is not certain that this author really admits of natural religion; at least he doth not acknowledge its necessity. No, my dear brethren: "If I am mistaken, says he,
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it is without design. This is sufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime. And though you should be mistaken in the same manner, it is of very little consequence." That is to say, it is sufficient, according to this writer, to be persuaded you are in possession of the truth, in order that such persuasion, though attended with the most monstrous errors, should not be a subject of reproach; and that every man, who professes himself to be sincere and ingenuous, should be accounted religious and wise, though adopting even the horrid doctrines of atheism. Is not this to throw open the door to all the modes of superstition, fanatical systems, and chimerical notions of the human mind? is not this a maxim that would countenance as many different religions and modes of worship as there are different people in the world? Alas! my dear brethren, be not deceived in this particular. Sincerity is no farther to be esteemed than as it is docile or enlightened. We are commanded to study our religion, and to believe its doctrines in sincerity and truth. We have, for our warrant, the authority of the church; let us learn to know it, and to repose ourselves safely therein. We may then place confidence in our sincerity, and spend our lives in peaceful expectation of that moment which shall open to us the light of eternity.

A further instance, my dear brethren, of the flagrant insincerity of the unbeliever we are refuting, is the manner in which he supposes the Catholic and the Christian to reason on matters of religion. What futile and ridiculous arguments doth he put into the mouths, both of the one and the other, in order to render them contempt-

temptible ! He hath written an imaginary dialogue between a Christian whom he supposes inspired, and an infidel whom he styles a rationalist. Hear what they are made to say. The former begins. "Your reason tells you that the whole is greater than a part ; but I tell you, from God, that a part is greater than the whole." To which the latter replies : "And who are you that dare to tell me that God contradicts himself? In whom shall I rather believe? in him who instructs me, by means of reason, in the knowledge of eternal truths ; or in you who would impose on me, in his name, the greatest absurdity?"

But with what assurance, my dear brethren, doth this writer impute such arguments to Christians? The God of reason, we affirm to be the God of revelation also. Reason and revelation are the two organs by which he hath been pleased to make himself known to mankind, either by way of teaching them the truth, or instructing them in the knowledge of his will. Should one of these organs contradict the other, it is certain that God would contradict himself. But can God be said to contradict himself, because he commands us to believe incomprehensible truths? You tell us, ye impious infidels, that the tenets, which we look upon to be revealed, contradict eternal truths : but it is not sufficient for you merely to assert this ; and could you have proved it, you would have done it long ago, and triumphed in the victory. The insincerity of the author of *Emilius*, is not less reprehensible in the language of his pretended catholic. "We catholics, says he, make a great noise about the authority of the church : but
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what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to establish this authority, as other sects require immediately to establish their doctrines? The church determines that the church has a right to determine. Is not this a special proof of its authority?" Who would not think, my dear brethren, from the pretences of this impostor, that the authority of the church is to be proved only by its own decisions; and that it proceeds arbitrarily thus, "I determine that I am infallible; therefore, I am infallible." A scandalous imputation, my dear brethren! The grounds of Christianity, the spirit of the gospel, and even the errors and weakness of the human understanding, all serve to demonstrate that the church established by Jesus Christ is an infallible church. We are assured, that, as the divine Legislator always instructed mankind in the ways of truth, the church of Christ will ever do the same. We prove the authority of the church therefore, not from that authority itself, but from that of Jesus Christ; a method of reasoning not less exact than that which he reproaches us with is senseless and ridiculous.

It is not only in our times, my dear brethren, that the spirit of irreligion hath been a spirit of independence and revolt. And, in fact, how is it to be expected that men, so daring as to refuse to submit to the authority of God himself, should respect that of kings, who are representatives of God; or that of magistrates, who are the representatives of kings? "Mankind, says the author of *Emilius* to his pupil, is essentially made up of the common people; so that, were there not a king left upon the face of the earth, they would not be missed, and things would go

on just as well without them.—The many (says he a little farther) will be always sacrificed to the few, and public interest to that of particulars. The specious names of justice and moderation will be made the instruments of violence and the weapons of iniquity. Hence it follows, (continues he) that those distinguished orders of men, which pretend to be useful to the rest, are in reality, at the expence of the rest, useful only to themselves: and hence may be determined in what consideration they ought to be held, according to the rules of right reason and justice.” Thus, my dear brethren, doth impiety presume to question the intentions of Him *by whom kings reign*; thus doth it take delight in corrupting the sources of public felicity, and in propagating those maxims which tend to confusion and anarchy, with all their dreadful consequences! But what doth religion teach us in this case? “Fear God, honour the king *—— Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation *.”

Yes, my dear brethren, in every thing relative to civil objects, you ought to be as obedient to your prince, and to those who are deputed to exercise his authority, as unto God himself. Your duty to that supreme Being alone should set bounds to your submission; and if then you should be deemed culpable, and suffer for your obedience to his great commands, you should

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* 1 Peter ii. 17.

* Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

submit without murmur or complaint. Even Nero and Domitian themselves, who chose rather to be a scourge to the earth than the fathers of their people, were accountable only to God for the abuse of that power he put into their hands.

“ Christians (says *St Augustine*) are obedient to their temporal lord, for the sake of their eternal one.”

We have taken notice, my dear brethren, but of a few of the many impieties contained in this treatise of *Education*; a work equally meriting the anathemas of the church, and the severity of the laws: and what more can be necessary to inspire you with horror against it? Miserable would it be for you, and unhappy for society, if your children were educated in the principles of this author. As nothing but religion hath taught us to know the nature of man, his greatness, his misery, and future destiny, it belongs only to that religion to form the understanding of youth, to improve their manners, and to procure for them lasting happiness both in this life and that which is to come. We are not insensible, my dear brethren, how laborious and difficult a task is the work of a truly Christian education; nor that a very considerable share of prudence and knowledge is necessary to discharge it. What an admirable mixture of good nature and resolution it requires! What prudence, to adapt ourselves to all conditions, ages, dispositions and characters, without departing from our duty! what zeal, what patience, to nourish in young and tender minds the precious seeds of innocence and virtue; to root up, as far as possible, those vicious inclinations,

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tions, which are the sad effects of our original depravity; and, in a word, to teach them, according to *St Paul*, to “live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ *!” We say therefore unto all those who are charged with so important and honourable a function as the education of youth, Plant ye and water, in the firm hope that the Lord, assisting your endeavours, will give an increase: “Be instant in season and out of season,” according to the directions of the same apostle; “reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine †.” Above all, be careful to unite instruction with example: instruction without example is a disgrace to the instructor, and a subject for scandal to him who is instructed. Let the pious and charitable *Tobit* be your model; “carefully instruct your children, in doing the works of justice, in giving alms, in calling to mind the Lord, and in praising him at all times in sincerity and with all their might;” and your posterity, like that of this holy patriarch, will be loved of God and of man.

But at what time ought the education of children to commence? At the first dawn of intelligence: and this dawn is sometimes premature. “Train up a child in the way he should go, (saith the wise man;) and when he is old, he will not depart from it ‡.” Such is in fact the ordinary course of human life: even in the midst of licentiousness, and during the empire of the passions, the principles of a Christian

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* Titus ii. 12. † 2 Tim. iv. 1. ‡ Prov. xxii. 6.

education afford a light which occasionally discovers to the sinner the horror of that abyss into which he is plunged, and displays the means of his escape. How many are there, I say again, who, after having spent their youth in vice and libertinism, are brought back by this light into the paths of virtue; and, pursuing, though late, the principles of religion and humanity, become an honour to themselves and to their country!

It remains, my dear brethren, that, in the close of this exhortation, I conjure you by the mercy of God, to attach yourselves inviolably to that holy religion in which you have had the happiness to be educated; to defend yourselves against the approach of an absurd philosophy, which hath nothing less in view than to rob you of the inheritance of Jesus Christ, to render his promises void, and to set him on a footing with the founders of those religions whose frivolous or pernicious doctrines have proved their imposture. The Christian faith is despised, rejected, and insulted, only by those who are ignorant of it, or on whose irregularities it is too great a restraint. But the gates of hell shall never prevail against it. The Christian and catholic church is the commencement of the eternal kingdom of Jesus Christ: "Nothing is stronger (says St John Demascene) than the church; it is a rock which the waves beat against in vain; it is a mountain which nothing can shake."

For the foregoing causes, respecting the new treatise on education, entitled *Emilius*, &c. by *J. J. Rousseau, citizen of Geneva*; after consulting with divers persons distinguished for their learning and piety, and calling upon the name
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of the Lord, we condemn the said book, as containing abominable doctrines, calculated to invalidate the principles of natural justice, and to subvert the foundations of the Christian religion: as inculcating maxims contrary to the morality of the gospel; tending to disturb the peace of society, and to excite subjects to revolt against the authority of their lawful sovereigns: as containing a great number of propositions severally false, scandalous, full of rancour against the church and its ministers, derogatory from the respect due to the holy scriptures and the traditions of the church, erroneous, impious, blasphemous and heretical. We therefore expressly forbid the inhabitants of our diocese to read or keep the said book, under the severest penalty of the law. We also direct that this our Mandate be read in all the parochial churches of the city, suburbs, and diocese of *Paris*; and also to be published and affixed wherever it may be judged needful. Given at our Archiepiscopal palace in *Paris*. Aug. 20. 1762.

Signed, CHRISTOPHER Archbishop of *Paris*,

By M. DE LA TOUCHE.

A N

Expostulatory Letter

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CHRISTOPHER DE BEAUMONT,
Archbishop of *Paris*.

WHEREFORE, my Lord, should there be any altercation between you and me? what language can we speak, or how shall we understand each other, when there is hardly any thing in common between us?

I am compelled, nevertheless, to make you a reply; you yourself have compelled me to it. Had you only attacked my book, your censures might have passed unanswered: but you have attacked my personal character; and by so much the greater sanction your authority bears in the eye of the public, the less it becomes me to be silent when I am the object of your defamation. But before I proceed to my defence, I cannot forbear reflecting a little on the peculiarity of my destiny: peculiar indeed to myself alone. I was born with some share of natural genius; the public have authorised me to make this boast. I spent my youth, nevertheless, in a happy obscurity, out of which I never attempted to emerge. Had I made such an attempt, indeed, it would have been as great a peculiarity, that,
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during the vivacity of youth, I should not have succeeded, as that I should succeed too well in the sequel, when that vivacity began to decay. In this obscurity, my Lord, instead of a fortune I always despised, and a name I have since bought too dear, I possessed the only blessings my heart was desirous of, those of tranquillity and friendship. Thus, easy in my mind, and happy in my friends, I drew near my fortieth year; when, unluckily, an academical question engaged my attention, and drew me into a profession for which nature never intended me. The unexpected success of my first essay proved seductive. A numerous party of opponents started up against me, and, without understanding my arguments, answered them with a petulance that piqued me, and a degree of vanity that perhaps excited mine. I stood up, of course, in my own defence; and, being urged from one dispute to another, found myself engaged in a career of controversy almost before I was aware. Thus I became an author at a time of life when authors usually throw up their profession, and a man of letters even from my contempt for that character. From this time I have been a writer of some little consequence with the public: but from this time, alas! my friends and my repose have left me. My labour was all I got for my pains; and a little reputation was to make up for every thing else. If this be an indemnification to those who are ever absent from themselves, it never was any to me.

Had I placed even for a moment any hopes on so frivolous a gratification, I should have been soon undeceived. In what a fluctuation hath the public opinion constantly been with regard

regard to my abilities and character! Being at a distance, I was judged of only by interest or caprice, and for hardly two days together was ever looked upon in the same light. Sometimes I was a dark and gloomy being, at others an angel of light. I have seen myself, within the space of a year, applauded, courted, entertained, and requested even at court; and again speedily after, insulted, threatened, hated, and condemned. Over night, assassins lay in wait for me in the streets; and in the morning, I was threatened with a *lettre-de-cachet*. The good and the evil came from almost the same source; and both of them were the effect of a mere song.

I have written, it is true, on several subjects, but always on the same principles; I had constantly the same system of morals, the same faith, the same maxims, and, if you will, the same opinions. Very different, however, have been the opinions that have been passed on my books, or rather on the author of my books; because I have been judged rather from the subjects I treated of, than from my sentiments on those subjects. After the publication of my first discourse*, I was said to be a writer fond of paradoxes, who amused himself in proving things he did not believe. After my Letter on the French Music, I was called a professed enemy to that nation, and was very near being treated as a conspirator and traitor: one would have thought, by the zeal shewn on that occasion, that the fate of the French monarchy depended on the reputation of their opera. After my discourse on the Inequality of Mankind, I was

deemed.

* In answer to the question, Whether the cultivation of the arts and sciences had contributed to the purity of manners?

deemed an atheist and misanthrope: after my Letter to Mr d'Alembert on the theatres, I was celebrated as the defender of Christian morals: after *Eloisa*, I was supposed to be passionate and tender: at present, I am a monster of impiety, and shall probably by and by be a miracle of devotion.

Thus fluctuating is the public opinion concerning me; those who adopt it being as ignorant why they detest me now, as why they once respected me. As to myself, however, I have always remained the same; more zealous, perhaps, than enlightened in my researches, but sincere in all, even against myself; simple and well-meaning, but susceptible and weak; often doing wrong, yet always respecting what was right; connected by friendship, never by circumstances, and ever more strongly influenced by sentiment than interest; requiring nothing from others; unwilling to render myself dependent on any; submitting to their prejudices as little as to their will, and preserving my own as free as my reason; fearing God, without being afraid of the devil; reasoning on matters of religion, without licentiousness; approving neither impiety nor fanaticism, but hating persecutors still worse than infidels; without disguising my sentiments from any one, without affectation, without artifice, without deceit; telling my faults to my friends, my sentiments to all the world, and to the public those truths which concern it, without flattery and without pride; equally careless whether I should please or offend it. Such are my crimes, and such are my merits.

At length, totally disgusted with that intoxicating vapour of reputation, which inflates,
without

without satisfying; wearied with importunities of indolent visitors, who, over-burdened with their own time, were prodigal of mine; and sighing after the necessary repose my heart is so fond of, I had joyfully laid down my pen. Satisfied with the reflection that I had never taken it up but for the good of my fellow-creatures, I required only, as the reward of my zeal, that I might be permitted to live unmolested in my retreat, and to die in peace. In this, however, I was mistaken: the officers were sent to apprehend me, and just at the moment that I flattered myself the troubles of my life were at an end, my greatest misfortunes began. There is something very particular in all this; yet this is nothing.

A citizen of Geneva gets a book printed in Holland; and by an arret of the Parliament of Paris, this book is burnt by the common hangman, without any respect shewn to the sovereign whose privilege it had obtained. A Protestant proposes, in a Protestant country, certain objections against the Church of Rome; and he is condemned by the parliament of Paris. A republican makes objections, in a republican state, against monarchy; and he is condemned by the parliament of Paris. The parliament of Paris must surely have strange notions of their jurisdiction, to suppose it extends over the whole human race.

The same parliament, ever so remarkably circumspect in their proceedings when individuals of their own nation are concerned, break thro' all order in passing sentence on a poor foreigner. Without knowing whether he was really the author of the book imputed to him, whether he
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